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Introduction
In many countries, the labour market has displayed an increase in flexible jobs in general, and in temporary jobs in particular. There is an extensive debate on the extent to which such jobs improve welfare in general and help individual workers in particular. It is often argued that the existence of temporary work is especially beneficial to currently unemployed workers, because it provides them opportunities to gain work experience and acquire human capital, to deepen the attachment to the labour market, and to search more effectively for more desirable jobs. Temporary job experience may be informative about the ability and motivation of the individual (screening or signalling). Some studies show that employers indeed use atypical contracts as a way of screening for permanent jobs (e.g. Storrie, 2002; Houseman et al., 2003) . In this paper we examine the extent to which temporary work facilitates individual unemployed workers to move from unemployment to regular work, that is, the extent to which temporary work acts as a stepping-stone towards regular work.
Our empirical analysis follows the 'timing of events' approach formalised by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) . We use longitudinal survey data of individuals to estimate a multistate duration model. The model specifies the transition rates from unemployment to temporary jobs, from temporary jobs to regular work, and from unemployment directly to regular work. Each transition rate is allowed to depend on observed and unobserved explanatory variables as well as on the elapsed time spent in the current state. To deal with selection effects, we allow the unobserved determinants to be dependent across transition rates. For example, if more motivated individuals have less trouble finding permanent jobs but are also over-represented among those in temporary jobs, then a casual observer who does not take this into account may conclude that there is a positive causal effect even if in reality there is none. 1 We also exploit subjective responses on whether the individual desires to have a regular job. We exploit the multi-spell nature of the data to reduce the dependence of the results on functional form specifications. The 'timing of events' approach exploits variation in observed moments of transitions in order to empirically distinguish between causal effects and selection effects. Somewhat informally, if a transition to a temporary job is often quickly succeeded by a transition into a regular job, for any constellation of explanatory variables, then this is strong evidence of a causal effect. 2 Here we adopt the specific model framework developed by Van den Berg, Holm and Van Ours (2002) , for two reasons. First, it allows in a natural way for 'lock-in' effects of temporary jobs, meaning that they may involve a temporary standstill of search activities for other jobs. Secondly, it allows for heterogeneous treatment effects, meaning that the effect of having a temporary job on the transition rate to regular work may vary across observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Because of lock-in effects and effect heterogeneity, the parameter estimates are hard to interpret. We contribute to the methodological literature by analysing this in some detail and by developing a graphical procedure to express the main results.
The estimation results also shed light on whether the individuals with a high incidence and/or duration of unemployment flow into temporary work more often, and whether they benefit more from a stepping-stone effect of temporary work. More in general, we address whether individuals who benefit from temporary work also have a high transition rate into temporary work. This is of importance from a policy point of view. If certain types of individuals barely flow into temporary work although their average duration until regular work would be substantially reduced by it, then it may be sensible to stimulate the use of temporary work among this group, for example by helping individuals to register at temporary work agencies.
We abstract from effects of the existence of temporary jobs on the transition rate from unemployment directly into regular work (i.e. without intervening temporary work spell). It can be argued that this effect is negative if a temporary job facilitates a move to a regular job and if unemployed individuals are aware of this. However, the data do not allow for identification of this effect. We also abstract from equilibrium effects. Temporary contracts imply lower layoff costs and therefore stimulate employment creation (see for example Bentolila and Bertola, 1990; Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1994; Booth, 1997; Hoffmann and Walwei, 1999) . Furthermore, the economic performance of firms may improve if there is less need to hoard workers as an insurance against a sudden upswing in demand (Pacelli, 2002; Kahn, 2000 , Von Hippel et al., 1997 . The use of temporary workers may reduce cyclical swings in labour productivity, since firms might be better able to shed workers quickly during a downturn (Estevão and Lach, 1999) .
To the extent that the data allow us, we also examine how job characteristics of regular jobs depend on whether they were directly preceded by a spell of unemployment or whether there was an intermediate spell of temporary work (see also Booth et al., 2002; Houseman, 2001). 3 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the data set, discusses some variables that we use in the analyses, and provides descriptives. Section 3 presents the model.
The estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
Data
We use the OSA labour supply panel, which is a longitudinal dataset collected by the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA). This dataset follows a random sample of Dutch households over time since 1985, by way of biannual face-to-face interviews. The survey concentrates on individuals who are between 16 and 64 years of age, and who are not fulltime students. Therefore only households with at least one person in this category are included. All individuals in the household who fall under this category -head of the household, partner, children and other household members -are interviewed. This results in some 4000 individuals per wave. All households that cooperate in a wave are asked to participate again two years later except if all household members became over 65 years of age. An attempt is made to locate family (members) who moved. If household members refuse to participate then the other members are surveyed anyway. If the whole household refuses, a replacement household is approached. A replacement household matches the refusing one by sex, age, family size and region. We use data from 1988 to . The 1988 wave consists of 4464 individuals. In 1998, a quarter of them is still in the panel. In 1990 In , 1992 In , 1996 and 2000 refreshment samples were drawn, so that in 2000 the sample size was 4185. Van den Berg and Lindeboom (1998) and Van den Berg, Lindeboom and Ridder (1994) study the effect of attrition in the OSA data on the estimates of the transition rates between unemployment and employment and between jobs. They find that although attrition is sometimes sizeable, it does not have discernible effects on the estimates of these rates. These two studies also provide ample background information on the data as well as references to other studies using these data.
In the OSA panel, an effort is made to collect extensive information on the labour market histories of the individual respondents. Individuals are asked about their labour market status two years ago -the previous interview date -about all transitions made since then, and about the current labour market status. For every transition we observe when it happened, why it happened, by which channel the new position was found and what the respective labour market positions were. Regarding the labour market position after a change, individuals can choose from: other function with same employer, employee at other employer, self-employed, co-working partner of self-employed, no paid job but looking for one, no paid job and not looking for one, military service, and full-time education. From these labour market histories we obtain the sequence of labour market states occupied and the sojourn times in these states. People are defined to be unemployed when they do not have a job but are looking for one. One does not need to receive unemployment benefits to be unemployed.
We define regular work as being in a job that is a permanent job or being in a job with a limited-term contract that is supposed to become permanent. In the Netherlands, starting on a one-year contract in a job is very common, and practically everybody gets a subsequent offer of a permanent contract for the same job. These one-year contract jobs are not the temporary jobs we are interested in here, since these are by definition a starting point for regular employment. Instead, we define temporary jobs as the more contingent types of jobs: fixed-term jobs, temporary agency work, on-call contracts and subsidised temporary jobs. It should be noted that in the Netherlands, contrary to certain other countries, unemployed individuals who are registered at commercial temporary work agencies but are currently not assigned to an employer, do not receive wage income and are considered to be unemployed. This also applies to our data.
Concerning the employment positions at the survey moments we observe the wage, number of hours worked, industry, occupation, type of work, type of contract, etcetera. For 5 periods between survey moments we have less information, and this leads to two problems.
First, we do not observe many characteristics of jobs that start and end between two consecutive interviews. Notably, we often do not observe the wage of such jobs. This implies that the set of explanatory variables that we can use is mostly restricted to background characteristics of the individual (listed below). Secondly, it is not always clear whether a job that starts and ends between two consecutive interviews is temporary or not. If case of doubt we infer the type of contract from other variables. We use the stated channel by which the job was found -this can be a temporary help agency -and the stated reason why transitions into and out of the job are made -to get more job security or because of the end of contract, respectively. In some cases these variables are missing, and we right-censor the unemployment spell at the moment of the transition into such a job. The latter occurred in 12% of all spells.
We can then measure the duration between the start of unemployment and the moment at which the individual moves into either regular or temporary work. Subsequently, we can measure the duration from the start of a temporary job until the moment at which the individual moves to a regular job. The latter duration period may include intermittent temporary jobs and periods of unemployment in between. All these durations may be rightcensored due to a transition to another labour market state, or due to reaching the end of the observation window.
We do not include unemployment spells that started before the first interview, so that there are no initial conditions problems. The indicated selection results in a sample of 976 individuals. All individuals have become unemployed at least once during the time period 1988-2000. We use up to three spells of unemployment per individual. This results in 1175 spells. , 1997) . Transitions from temporary jobs to regular work are frequent, and, indeed, more frequent than transitions from unemployment to regular work. This suggests that temporary employment might serve as a stepping-stone towards regular work. Figure 1 shows the total number of observed labour market transitions in our subsample. Note that some types of transitions do not play a role in the empirical analysis below, in particular the transitions to and from 'not in the labour force', the transitions to unemployment, and the transitions from regular (or permanent) employment to temporary employment. 
The transition rates
In the introduction of the paper we mentioned the distinguishing features of the 'timing of events' methodology that we apply. We adopt the model framework of Van den Berg, Holm and Van Ours (2002), which was constructed to study the existence of stepping-stone jobs in the Dutch medical profession. In our context, the model specifies the transition rates from unemployment to temporary employment and to regular employment, and from temporary employment to regular employment. In general, the transition rate or hazard rate θB ij B is defined as the rate at which an individual flows from one state i to another state j, given that (s)he survived in state i until the current moment. We define the indices i and j to have values: 1 = unemployment, 2 = temporary employment, and 3 = regular employment. We specify a mixed proportional hazard model for each transition rate. Let observed characteristics be denoted by xB ij B and the baseline hazard by λB ij B (.), for the transition rate from state i to state j. In addition, βB ij B is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The multiplicative random effects vB ij B are state and exit destination specific. Then,
and the corresponding survival function equals
Note that we implicitly imposed that the hazard rates only depend on the elapsed duration in the current state and not on earlier outcomes.
We now define a spell to be the time span between entry into unemployment and entry into regular work. For a given individual, the values of vB ij B are assumed to be identical across different spells. To deal with selective inflow into temporary work and permanent work, we allow the vB ij B to be related for a given individual. For example, the observed transition rate from temporary work to regular work may be higher than the observed rate from unemployment to regular work just because individuals for whom it is easy to find regular work tend to self-select into temporary work. Then vB 12 B is positively related to vB 13 B and vB 23 B . It is also possible that persons who most easily find regular work find less easily a temporary job, which means that vB 12 B and vB 13 B are negatively related.
The individual likelihood contribution of this model is unconditional on the unobserved heterogeneity terms v (see e.g. Lancaster, 1990) . With unobserved heterogeneity, the likelihood function is not separable in the parameters of different transition rates. Abbring and Van den Berg (2003) analyse the identification of these types of models. It turns out that the availability of multiple spell data is useful in the sense that fewer assumptions are needed for identification, and therefore the empirical results are less sensitive to aspects of the model specification. See also Abbring and Van den Berg (2004) for comparisons to inference with latent variable methods and panel data methods.
An important condition for identification concerns the absence of anticipation of the moment of treatment. This basically means that the individual should not know more about the moment of treatment than is captured by the modelled distribution of the duration until treatment. In our context, anticipation occurs for example if the individual stops looking for regular work (or actually has an increased transition rate into regular work) upon the moment it is decided that he will enter a temporary job in a certain time period from now. If the researcher does not observe the moment of this decision then the estimates of current transition rates are determined by future events. However, such a scenario seems unlikely in 10 the present setup, and indeed one may argue that the "no anticipation" assumption is in line with the flexible nature of temporary work. The matching of employers and employees is a random process, and temporary workers are often called at short notice. Against this one may argue that some individuals are registered at temporary work agencies as looking for such jobs, but that this is unobserved, and that these individuals may have a higher rate of moving from unemployment to temporary work. However, this is captured as unobserved heterogeneity. Also, the data contain an explanatory variable indicating whether the individual, when unemployed, prefers temporary work to regular work.
Parameterisation and quantities of interest
We follow the literature by taking the duration dependence functions (or baseline hazards) λB ij B (t) to have piecewise constant specifications. We subdivide a duration axis into a finite number of intervals numbered 1,2,… from the origin onwards. Let t denote the elapsed duration, τ refer to the successive intervals and IB τ B (t) denote time-varying dummy variables that are equal to 1 iff t is in the interval τ. The piecewise constant duration dependence function can then be written as
With an increasing number of time intervals, any duration dependence pattern can be approximated arbitrarily closely. We use 8 intervals. This captures the empirical shapes well.
We take the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term v to be multivariate discrete with a finite number of mass points, and we take the locations of the mass points as well as the associated probabilities to be unknown parameters. Each individual has a unique set of vB 12 B ,vB 13 B ,vB 23 B . We allow for N different types of individuals, where a type is characterized by a unique set of values of vB 12 B ,vB 13 B ,vB 23 B . Let pB n B with n=1,2,…,N denote probabilities that add to 1, and let vB ijn B denote a realization of the random variable vB ij B . Following the specifications of the distribution G of v in Card and Sullivan (1988) 
The resulting family of distributions of v is a special case of the general multivariate discrete distribution. The latter has N possible realisations of each vB ij B , and every combination of realisations of vB ij B and vB i*j* B is allowed, so that the vector v has NP 3 Ppossible realisations. This amounts to NP 3 P+3N-1 unknown parameters, which, in the light of the large number of parameters elsewhere in the model, is less feasible even for N=2. Our specification of the distribution of v restricts the general multivariate distribution by imposing some structure on the relation between the elements of vB 12 B ,vB 13 B ,vB 23 B , and indeed it has only 4N-1 unknown parameters. Note that since we also allow for constant terms in the vectors of regression coefficients, not all of these parameters are identified. Hence, we normalise the mean of (vB 12 B ,vB 13 B ,vB 23 B ) to be 1. This reduces the number of estimated parameters for the distribution of v by three.T P 4 P T Note that the relation between the elements of vB 12 B ,vB 13 B ,vB 23 B is not imposed to be monotone. As noted above, the extent to which vB 12 B is related to vB 13 B and vB 23 B determines the extent to which selectivity affects the relation in the raw data between having temporary work or not on the one hand, and the rate of entering regular work on the other hand. In the empirical analysis, we report standard errors for the estimates conditional on the value of N.
We now examine which model quantities are informative on the treatmentT P 5 P T or stepping-stone effect. The discussion is informal and suppresses notation in terms of counterfactual outcomes (see Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003) . For expositional reasons we briefly resort to an extension of the above model framework, allowing θB 23 B to depend on the time since entry into unemployment (say, τ) as well as on the time t since entry into temporary work. Consider an individual who became unemployed at time zero. The treatment effect of having moved into temporary work at a given time tB UE B on the individual transition rate into regular work at a time t>tB UE B , compared to not having entered temporary work until and including t, equals θB 23 Clearly, if we would divide the states of unemployment and/or temporary employment into a number of substates then the number of parameters would become too large to be able to estimate the model. The present use of the term "treatment" is somewhat out of line with the common use, because the move into a temporary job is to a large extent driven by the behaviour of the individual under consideration.
The fact that we allow βB 13 B to be different from βB 23 B and that we allow vB 13 B /vB 23 B to be different across individuals means that we allow the individual effects of temporary work to differ between individuals. The average effects can then be obtained by averaging the individual effect over x and v. note that a zero treatment effect can only be attained if there is no duration dependence in the transition rate from temporary work to regular work, because otherwise the numerator varies over t whereas the denominator cannot. In other words, if there is such duration dependence then there will be a treatment effect for at least some t. Ruling out such duration dependence would be absurd in the light of the fact that temporary jobs may involve a lock-in effect, causing the transition rate into regular work to be lower right after having entered a temporary job and higher some time later. Indeed, the absence of duration dependence is violated by the data. Also, it would be absurd to let the time variation in the transition rate from temporary to regular work be functionally related to the time variation in the transition rate from unemployment to regular work at the same point of time in the counterfactual case.
In our actual parameterisation, the transition rate from temporary work to regular work depends on the time since entry into temporary work, whereas the rate from unemployment into regular work depends on the time since entry into unemployment. Therefore, it can be expected that the results indicate a treatment effect on the transition rate into regular work.
Of course it is still interesting to examine the duration dependence patterns and average levels of the transition rates into regular work. For example, if for an individual with given values of x and v it always holds that θB 23 B (t|x,vB 23 B )>θB 13 B (τ|x,vB 13 B ), then the individual treatment effect is positive at all points of time. However, given the complexity of the model, a quantitative assessment of the over-all effect of temporary work is more easily studied with an outcome measure that aggregates over effects on instantaneous transition rates. For this purpose we use the cumulative probability of moving into a regular job, at various points of time after entry into unemployment. We quantify these probabilities, as well as the effect of temporary work on them, by using the estimated model. First, it is not difficult to show that the cumulative probability of moving into regular work within t periods after having entered unemployment equals
where the indices of S refer to the corresponding duration variable (i.e. SB 12 B is the survivor function of the duration from unemployment into temporary work, which is a latent variable).
The first part of the expression equals the probability of moving into regular work by way of 13 a direct transition from unemployment, whereas the second part equals the probability of moving into regular work by way of temporary work. Logically, the probability of moving into regular work directly from unemployment does not converge to 1 as t goes to infinity.
The relevant population estimate of (1) follows by integration of the total expression over the distribution of observed and unobserved characteristics.
The decomposition of (1) into its two terms does not capture a treatment effect. To see this, note that both terms are positive even if there is no individual treatment effect, i.e. if the states of unemployment and temporary work are equivalent in the sense that the transition rate from temporary work to regular work at any calendar time point equals the transition rate from unemployment to regular work that would have prevailed at that point. One can define a sensible treatment effect by comparing the actual magnitude of expression (1) to the magnitude in a situation where the two transition rates into regular work are equal at any point of time. However, as we have just seen, the latter is not covered by the model parameterisation. Fortunately, there is an equivalent way to quantify the probability of moving into regular work within t periods in the absence of a treatment effect: simply impose in (1) that the transition rate into temporary work θB 12 B equals zero. This holds for the general model parameterisation where θB 23 B is also allowed to depend on the time τ since entry into unemployment, as well as for our actual parameterisation. In Appendix 2 we demonstrate this formally.
Some comments are in order. First, in the absence of temporary work, some of the individuals who would otherwise have moved into regular work by way of a temporary job move into regular work directly from unemployment. Therefore, the cumulative fraction of individuals moving into regular work exceeds the observed fraction of individuals who move directly from unemployment into regular work. This counterfactual cumulative probability converges to 1 as t goes to infinity. Secondly, all these calculations assume that the absence of temporary jobs does not affect the magnitude of the direct transition rate from unemployment to regular work (recall the discussion in Section 1). There are many reasons why this assumption may be incorrect. Notably, there may be equilibrium effects on the demand and supply of regular jobs, and individuals may increase their search intensity for regular work. 14 Thirdly, it is not possible to nonparametrically test whether the curve described by (1) is different from the curve obtained by imposing θB 12 B =0. Of course, the curve described by (1) can be estimated nonparametrically, using the Kaplan-Meier estimator to deal with right censoring at the end of the observation window. However, the curve obtained by imposing θB 12 B =0 is counterfactual. It cannot be estimated from durations until transitions from unemployment into regular work, because these are right-censored by actual transitions into temporary work, and such censoring times are dependent because they depend on unobserved heterogeneity.
Estimation results

4.1.
Stepping-stone effect
We start with the estimates of the shapes of the individual transition rates as functions of the elapsed durations in the states under consideration. Given the initial level of a transition rate (i.e., upon entry into the state under consideration), the shape of this rate is described by the parameters of the duration dependence function (see the estimates in Table 2a ). Figure 2 plots Evidently, from unemployment, the rate into temporary work is much smaller than the rate into regular work. However, once in temporary employment, the rate of flowing into regular work is larger than otherwise. This demonstrates the presence of a stepping-stone effect. One might expect that workers who accept a temporary job are initially strongly attached to that job, for example for contractual reasons. In some sense this is true: the transition from temporary into regular employment substantially increases after a period of one year. However, even newly employed temporary workers have a higher rate into regular work than unemployed workers. The treatment effect is unambiguously (and significantly) positive, regardless of the durations at which it is evaluated. Since the transition rate from temporary work to regular work increases during the temporary job, the accumulation of human capital may be a major reason for employers to prefer individuals who have occupied a temporary job. An increasing size of the social network among employed workers may also explain this. Apparently, for prospective 15 employers, being in a temporary job constitutes more than just a (positive) signal that one has been found acceptable for such a job. Of course, all transition rates are affected by conditions in the labour market and by the behaviour of the individual and prospective employers, and we should emphasise that in this paper we do not aim to formally estimate an economic model that distinguishes between the roles of these factors.
Note that the estimation results discussed above are not due to selection effects, because we corrected for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Estimates of a model without unobserved heterogeneity show a much larger stepping-stone effect. This indicates a strong selection over the direct and indirect routes. Note that the dashed curve in Figure 4 is only marginally higher than the dashed line in Figure 3 . This reflects the fact that the transition rate into temporary work is much lower than the transition rate from unemployment into regular work. Shutting down the temporary work channel does not affect many unemployed individuals, so there is no massive substitution towards the direct channel into regular work. However, in the presence of temporary work, the individuals who manage to move into temporary work face a very high transition rate into regular work, so that shutting down the temporary work channel implies a much lower over-all probability of moving into regular work. In sum, not many individuals move into temporary work, but those who do benefit enormously from it. In the next subsections we examine whether this result is an average result or whether it is uniformly valid for all types of individuals. 7 Table 2b presents the covariate effects on the individual transition rates. 8 Note that a positive sign indicates a shorter duration. The comparison of the coefficients for "unemployment to regular" to the coefficients for "temporary to regular" is informative on the variation of the stepping-stone effect across different types of individuals. Given the presence of a steppingstone effect, the comparison of the coefficients for "unemployment to regular" to "unemployment to temporary" is informative on the relevance of this effect for obtaining regular work. Before making these comparisons, we first discuss the coefficients themselves.
Covariate effects
7 Some recent studies consider the effect of temporary work on long run employment outcomes using models without potentially selective unobserved heterogeneity (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000, and Hagen, 2003) . Hagen found a stepping-stone effect of temporary work in Germany, Amuedo Dorantes found none for Spain. Gagliarducci (2004) considers the effect of the number of temporary jobs, taking selection effects into account. The transition rates into regular work are higher in labour markets with many vacancies per unemployed individual. This is generally found in the literature. However, it does not hold for the rate into temporary work. Apparently, this rate is less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. Bover and Gomez (1999) found this effect for Spain as well. The results also show that in general it is easier to become employed if one wants to work more hours. Older unemployed individuals need more time to move into regular and temporary positions. Individuals searching for part-time work have lower transition rates both into regular and temporary work.
Having a partner has a strong positive effect on the direct transition from unemployment to regular work. This effect is well known (for an overview of studies on this issue, see Ginter and Zavodny, 2001) . There is no generally accepted reason for this phenomenon. Partners may make individuals more productive and therefore more attractive to employers. Alternatively, individuals who are successful on the labour market may have characteristics that also make them attractive on the marriage market. The effect we find is larger for working partners than for non-working partners, which supports the selection hypothesis. However, men with a partner but without children have lower transition rates into temporary work, and this suggests that such men simply focus their search effort on regular work. Women with a working partner and women without children have higher transition rates into temporary work. Women with a working partner are often not breadwinner and may therefore have a lower need for job security.
Unemployed individuals who prefer temporary work to regular work do not make the direct transition from unemployment to a regular job often. However, they have a much higher probability of finding regular employment in succession to a temporary job. These individuals may have a particular reason to expect a temporary job to serve as a steppingstone.
Men with children at home have a higher transition rate from temporary to regular work. These men may be under high pressure to provide a satisfactory level of family income and thus may be eager to transform their insecure temporary job into a more secure regular position. We also find a negative effect for men with a partner, perhaps indicating that having a partner reduces the urgency for provision of a satisfactory level of family income by the man alone. 20 What do the covariate effects imply for the magnitude of the stepping-stone effect for different types of individuals? From a policy point of view, it is particularly interesting to focus on disadvantaged groups, notably ethnic minorities and women. For example, ethnic minorities have unemployment rates that are more than twice as large as native Dutch individuals -in 2002 7.7 versus 3.3 percent. The stepping-stone effect may be larger for ethnic minorities if employers who are reluctant to hire ethnic minorities can screen them by way of a temporary contract. In that case, it makes sense to stimulate unemployed immigrants to register at temporary work agencies. Table 2b shows that the direct transition rate to regular work is lower for ethnic minorities, while the transition rate from temporary to regular employment is much higher for them. This indicates a stepping-stone effect that is much higher than average and much higher than for natives. Note that the standard errors are large, and the estimated coefficients are insignificant. This may reflect the small number of ethnic minorities in the sample.
However, we do observe a significantly negative coefficient for the transition rate into temporary work. So, because ethnic minorities do not get temporary jobs very often, they do not benefit from any stepping-stone effect. As a result, the over-all probability of moving into regular work is substantially lower than for natives. Clearly, this supports policy measures that stimulate the use of temporary work by ethnic minorities, for example by helping them to register at temporary work agencies.
Because of the interaction terms with gender in the parameterised model it is hard to draw conclusions on the difference between men and women from Table 2b . Therefore we resort to a graphical analysis analogous to Figures 3 and 4 above (see Figure 5 , which is the analogue of Figure 3 ). There is little difference between men and women in the steppingstone effect of temporary jobs. Females have lower probabilities of finding regular jobs, but the effect of having a temporary job is about the same, and so is the use of the temporary work channel.
Contrasting singles and individuals who live with a partner gives very pronounced differences in outcomes. As noted before, it is generally found in the literature that singles have a weaker labour market position, and this is reflected by the fact that they have a lower probability of moving directly into regular work. However, for singles the stepping-stone effect is much larger, and the probability that they benefit from it is also much larger, so that 21 as a result they often obtain regular work through temporary work. Apparently, the flexibility associated with being single goes well together with the flexibility associated with temporary work. Another informative characteristic concerns whether the individual prefers temporary work over regular work upon entering unemployment. If the latter holds then it takes more time to move directly into regular work, but the stepping-stone effect is very large. This is plausible: such individuals are presumably aware of the size of the effect.
In general, despite the variation in the magnitude of the effect across workers, the effect is positive for virtually all types of workers that we can distinguish on the basis of observed characteristics, including those with a relatively weak labour market position. 22 4.3. Table 2c presents the estimates of the parameters of the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. In fact, these concern a slightly more general distribution than discussed in Section 3. In particular, we allow for realisations of all possible combinations of the value of the unobserved heterogeneity term in the transition rate from unemployment to regular work on the one hand, and the values of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the other transition rates on the other. This results in four types of individual values of the vector of unobserved heterogeneity terms (see Table 2c ). Only two groups have a substantial size, and if we remove the negligible Types 1 and 4 we again obtain the specification that we discussed in Section 3. Standard errors in parentheses. * indicates two-sided significance at a 10% level, ** at a 5% level.
Unobserved heterogeneity
As always in models with unobserved heterogeneity, the heterogeneity distribution estimates are difficult to interpret. First, they are determined by the set of included covariates. Secondly, the discrete heterogeneity distribution should be interpreted as an approximation of the true distribution. Keeping this in mind, note that Type 2 individuals have a low probability to find regular work directly from unemployment but a high probability to find temporary work, whereas for Type 3 it is the other way around. Type 2 individuals have a high stepping-stone effect. For Type 3 individuals v 23 <v 13 . As a result the 23 stepping-stone effect, which we concluded to exist in general, might be absent for this group.
The net effect depends on the elapsed durations and covariates at hand. The variances and correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms are all significantly different from zero.
This implies that a model that does not take the selection into temporary work into account is misspecified and leads to incorrect inference on the stepping-stone effect.
In general, the main results are robust with respect to a range of model specification features like the set of included covariates, the duration dependence intervals, and the numbers of mass points of the heterogeneity distribution.
Quality of jobs found
A limitation of analyses of treatment effects on unemployment durations is that they typically ignore effects on the type and quality of the accepted job. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to address this issue in detail either, since the wages that are earned, the hours worked, and the fringe benefits are not observed. The dataset only supplies job characteristics at survey dates of jobs held at survey dates, but it does not supply job characteristics at the moment of job acceptance, and it does not supply characteristics of jobs held in between survey dates. However, the data allow us to address the stability of the jobs. Ideally, this would have to be included in the duration model above. But our number of observations is limited, and inclusion of two other transitions, from temporary jobs to unemployment and from regular jobs to unemployment, is unfeasible. For this reason, we simply estimate duration models for the duration of the regular job, where the way it is found -directly or by way of temporary employment -is used as an explanatory variable (see Appendix 3).
The results indicate that the duration of the regular job does not depend on whether it is directly preceded by a temporary job or by unemployment. Simple t-tests also show that the reason why people separate from the regular job does not differ significantly between directly and indirectly found regular jobs. Regarding the exit state we do see a slight difference: jobs found by way of temporary employment end less often in unemployment and more often into a transition to another temporary job. However, this difference is not statistically significant. Together, this does not suggest that the jobs found by way of temporary work are very different from those found directly from unemployment. 24
Conclusion
Temporary work serves as a stepping-stone towards regular work. Having obtained a temporary job means that the transition rate into regular work is higher than in unemployment. The effect is positive regardless of the durations at which it is evaluated. It increases in the time since flowing into temporary work, suggesting that being in a temporary job constitutes more than just a (positive) signal that one has been found acceptable for such a job. All these results are obtained while correcting for selection effects associated with moving into temporary work.
The transition rate into temporary work is substantially lower than the transition rate from unemployment into regular work. Shutting down the temporary work channel does not affect many unemployed individuals, so there is no massive substitution towards the direct channel into regular work. However, those individuals who manage to move into temporary work face a very high subsequent transition rate into regular work. In sum, not many individuals move into temporary work, but those who do benefit enormously from it. As a result, the over-all probability of moving into regular work within say five years after entry into unemployment is substantially increased by the presence of temporary work.
The above effects are positive for virtually all workers, including workers with a relatively weak labour market position. Ethnic minorities have a high stepping-stone effect on the transition rate to regular work but they rarely flow into temporary jobs, so they do not benefit from the effect. This suggests that policy measures should be taken to stimulate the use of temporary work by ethnic minorities, for example by helping them to register at temporary work agencies.
25 Appendix 1. Sample statistics of explanatory variables Absence of treatment effects means that for all t and τ there holds that θB 23 B (t,τ)=θB 13 B (τ). This implies that SB 23 B (t-τ,τ)= SB 13 B (t)/SB 13 B (τ). If we substitute this into expression (2) and elaborate on this then we simply obtain SB 13 B (t). The latter is also obtained if we substitute into (2) that θB 12 B =0. (Notice that the first parts of expressions (1) and (2) do not change when imposing that for all t and τ there holds that θB 23 B (t,τ)=θB 13 B (τ).) 
Appendix 3. Analysis of the quality of the regular job
